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Comments and Casenotes
ZONING CHANGE: FLEXIBTLITY vs. STABIIUTY
By HERBERT GOLDMAN
The Maryland Court of Appeals has recently had five oppor-
tunities to express its views on changing existing zoning regulations by
amendment.' In four of these, the court affirmed the "original error
or change in conditions" test, using it to prohibit amendments of
original zoning ordinances.' In the fifth, it reaffirmed its acceptance
of the "floating zone" concept, thereby placing Maryland in the fore-
front of progressive zoning and planning to a limited extent.' Thus.
the court has evidenced an aversion to change by clinging to the "mis-
take or change" test, while at the same time granting its approval to
a new concept which might be said to be the antithesis of traditional
Euclidean zoning.
The court is not without its dissents, however. Judge Barnes
wrote lengthy, comprehensive criticisms of the majority opinions in
MacDonald, Miller, and Woodlawn, attacking the court's application
of the "mistake or change" test and advocating a much more liberal
test for judging the propriety of zoning amendments.4
Using these cases as the focal point, this comment will survey the
application of the "original error-change in condition" test in Maryland
and other jurisdictions, as well as the various tests used in other states.
Likewise, the use of the "floating zone" will be discussed in an effort
to find a workable tool for amendment in the face of the otherwise
stringent, stabilizing test ordinarily employed in Maryland.
ORIGINAL ERROR OR CHANGE IN CONDITION
In MacDonald v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince
George's County,5 application was made by a land company to reclassify
the property in question from R-R (rural residential) to R-H (multiple
family high rise residential). The Technical Staff of the Planning
1. Woodlawn Area Citizens Council v. Board of County Comm'rs for Prince
George's County, 216 A.2d 149 (Md. 1966) ; Mothershead v. Board of County Comm'rs
for Prince George's County, 240 Md. 365, 214 A.2d 326 (1965) ; Beall v. Montgomery
County Council, 240 Md. 77, 212 A.2d 751 (1965) ; Miller v. Abrahams, 239 Md. 263,
211 A.2d 309 (1965); MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs for Prince George's
County, 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965).
2. Woodlawn Area Citizens Council v. Board of County Comm'rs for Prince
George's County; Mothershead v. Board of County Comm'rs for Prince George's
County; Miller v. Abrahams; MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs for Prince
George's County, supra note 1.
3. Beall v. Montgomery County Council, 240 Md. 77, 212 A.2d 751 (1965).
4. The court in Mothershead applied the test in a unanimous opinion due to the
fact that Judge Barnes did not sit on the case. Had he sat, it is likely he would have
dissented there, too.
5. 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965).
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Commission recommended denial, as did the Regional Planning Board.
The Regional Council approved the application, however, as did the
Circuit Court when the ruling was appealed by nearby property owners.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, Oppenheimer, J., reversed, ruling
that there was neither evidence of error in the original zoning nor a
change in conditions so as to justify the proposed amendment.' Thus,
the court merely added to an already long line of cases which deter-
mined the propriety of zoning amendments on the basis of the "mistake
or change" test.
This test was first used in 1948 in the case of Northwest Mer-
chants Terminal v. O'Rourke.7 In that case, property holders attempted
to have their area rezoned in order to prevent the erection of a ware-
house in the neighborhood. In voiding the amendment, the Court of
Appeals ruled that there was a presumption of reasonableness as to
the original zoning, and that it was presumed to be well planned and
permanently arranged and subject to change only to meet a genuine
change in conditions."
In Hoffman v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,9 the court
allowed a rezoning based on the fact that by the original zoning the
land in question was unusable, and had, in fact, never been used for the
purposes for which it was zoned. Though never specifically mentioned,
the "original error" test clearly seemed to be the basis of the decision.
The first true declaration of the test was made in Kracke v. Wein-
berg."0 There, injunctive relief was sought by a property owner to
void a zoning change made by the city in changing his property from
commercial to residential. In voiding the change, the court said:
The presumption as to the original ordinance would be that the
zones were well planned and arranged and were to be more or less
permanent, subject to change only to meet genuine changes in
conditions. Where property is rezoned, it must appear that either
there was some mistake in the original zoning, or that the char-
acter of the neighborhood has changed to such an extent that such
action ought to be taken."
From that time on, the "mistake or change" test was firmly implanted
in Maryland zoning law, bringing with it a great many obstacles to
flexible zoning. First of all, there is an immediate presumption in favor
of the original zoning. Consequently, a most difficult burden is placed
on the person applying for the change. He must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that there was either an original error or a subsequent
change in conditions. This presumption in itself is indicative of an
attitude of stability and aversion to change.
6. The court's rulings were essentially the same in Miller v. Abrahams, 239
Md. 263, 211 A.2d 309 (1965) and Mothershead v. Board of County Comm'rs for
Prince George's County, 240 Md. 365, 214 A.2d 326 (1965).
7. 191 Md. 171, 60 A.2d 743 (1948).
8. The change in condition criteria was again discussed in Cassel v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950).
9. 197 Md. 294, 79 A.2d 367 (1951).
10. 197 Md. 339, 79 A.2d 387 (1951).
11. Id. at 347, 79 A.2d at 391.
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In Wakefield v. Kraft,12 the court was called upon to review the
legislative body's amendment of existing zoning from residential to a
lower use. The court ruled that it could not substitute its judgment
for that of the legislature if the question decided, i.e., whether there was
sufficient evidence to allow an amendment, was fairly debatable:
It is not the function, duty, or right of a Court to zone or rezone,
but only to determine whether the legislative body has properly
applied the governing law to the facts. If there is room for reason-
able debate as to whether the facts justify the municipal legislature
in deciding the need for its enactment, it must be upheld. It is only
when there is no room for reasonable debate, or a record barren
of supporting facts, that the Court can declare the legislative action
arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or an unequal application
of the law.' 3
The application of this test has led to many interesting results.
For example, in Board of Appeals of Baltimore County v. Bailey,'4 the
property owner wanted a change from a lower to a higher zone in
order to build a trailer park.'5 Though the Zoning Commission felt
that there could be no objection due to the fact that the rezoning was
from a lower to a higher use, the court held that there was still a need
to satisfy the "mistake or change" test; and since the issue was not
debatable, there being no evidence at all to satisfy the test, the court
overruled the Zoning Commission.' 6 Thus, even in the unusual situa-
tion where the amendment called for rezoning to a higher zone, the
proposal was blocked by the "mistake or change" test.
In Kroen v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County,17 the
landowner wanted to erect row houses in an area zoned for single-family
dwellings. He based his application on increased population caused by
the proximity of the Bethlehem Steel and Martin Company plants. His
application was denied, the court reasoning that:
It is a basic rule in the law of zoning that where a board of
city or county officials, under authority conferred by the Legis-
lature has enacted a zoning ordinance, judicial review of action
taken by the board is restricted and narrow in scope. An attack
upon a zoning ordinance, to be successful, must show affirmatively
and clearly that it is arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or illegal.
The presumption of reasonableness and constitutional validity
applies to rezoning as well as original zoning. The courts presume
that the original zoning is well planned and designed to be perma-
12. 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953).
13. Id. at 147, 96 A.2d at 29.
14. 216 Md. 536, 141 A.2d 502 (1958).
15. The Baltimore County zoning ordinances were odd in that a lower use (trailer
park) was permitted only in a residential zone higher than the one in which the
property owner already lived.
16. It had been argued in that case that the proposed Northeast Expressway would
cause a substantial change in conditions. The court held that if such a change occurred,
application for amendment would have to be made at that time.
17. 209 Md. 420, 121 A.2d 181 (1956).
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nent. Accordingly it is a firmly established rule that before a zon-
ing board reclassifies property from one zone to another, there
should be proof either (1) that there was a mistake in the original
zoning, or (2) that the character of the neighborhood was changed
to such an extent as to justify reclassification.'"
The aforementioned are but a few of the many cases in which the
Maryland court has applied the "original error-change in condition"
rule,' 9 and a survey of all the cases would indicate the court's unbend-
ing attitude in applying this rule and its concommitant preservation
of existing regulations.
Perhaps the only deviation from the court's antipathy toward
amendment of existing zoning ordinances appeared in Missouri Realty,
Inc. v. Ramer,20 where the court permitted an amendment from one resi-
dential zone to a lower residential zone. The court said:
It should be noted that this case involves an application for
reclassification from one residential sub-category to another; not
the removal of the land from the use category in which it was
placed when originally zoned, as was the situation in many of the
cases presented to this Court. In this respect, the situation is, to a
certain degree, different from the application to reclassify property
zoned as residential to commercial or industrial. 1
Thus, the court seems to adopt a more liberal attitude when reviewing
amendments from one use to a similar use.
This brief review of cases concerning the Maryland "mistake or
change" rule is indicative of the often insurmountable obstacles facing
the property owner or legislature desiring to amend the existing regula-
tions and the limited amount of aid that can be derived by appeal to
the judiciary.2 It is the thought of Judge Barnes, and the courts of a
18. Id. at 426, 121 A.2d at 184.
19. For other cases on point, see, e.g., Renz v. Bonfield Holding Co., 223 Md. 34,
158 A.2d 611 (1960) ; McBee v. Baltimore County, 221 Md. 312, 157 A.2d 258 (1960) ;
Hewitt v. County Comm'rs of Baltimore County, 220 Md. 48, 151 A.2d 144 (1959);
Muhly v. County Council for Montgomery County, 218 Md. 543, 147 A.2d 735 (1958) ;
Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County v. Bailey, 216 Md. 536, 141 A.2d 502
(1957) ; Conley v. Montgomery County, 216 Md. 379, 140 A.2d 525 (1957) ; Nelson v.
County Council for Montgomery County, 214 Md. 587, 136 A.2d 373 (1957); Board
of County Comm'rs of Talbott County v. Troxell, 214 Md. 135, 132 A.2d 845 (1957) ;
Mettee v. County Comm'rs of Howard County, 212 Md. 357, 129 A.2d 136 (1957);
Hardesty v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 211 Md. 172, 126 A.2d
621 (1956) ; Zinn v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 207 Md. 355, 114
A.2d 614 (1955); Temmink v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 205
Md. 489, 109 A.2d 85 (1954) ; Offutt v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County,
204 Md. 551, 105 A.2d 219 (1954).
20. 216 Md. 422, 140 A.2d 655 (1957).
21. Id. at 449, 140 A.2d at 658.
22. It may be noted that several other states also employ the "mistake or change"
test. See, e.g., Nowicki v. Planning & Zoning Bd. of Town of Milford, 148 Conn. 492,
172 A.2d 386 (1961) ; Kimball v. Court of Common Council of City of Meriden, 148
Conn. 97, 167 A.2d 706 (1961) ; Holly Development, Inc. v. Board of County Commr's
of County of Arapahoe, 140 Col. 95, 342 P.2d 1032 (1959) ; City of Jackson v.
Bridges, 243 Miss. 646, 139 So. 2d 660 (1962) ; Page v. City of Portland, 178 Ore. 632,
165 P.2d 280 (1946). A thorough review of all of the jurisdictions may be found in
YOKLUY, ZONING LAW & PRAcTic4 §§ 85-87 (Supp. 2d ed. 1964) ; and RATHKOPF, THn
LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 27-16 (1964).
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great many other states, that this test should be discarded in favor of a
more flexible, modern and workable test. The inherent difficulties with
this test, as well as the undesirable results attained in using it, have
led to the movement to discard it.
First of all, there are difficulties in applying the "mistake or
change" test. There are differences of opinion in merely defining what
constitutes a mistake, and what constitutes changed conditions can
likewise be a relative matter. For example, Judge Barnes has inter-
preted the majority of the court's definition to include only changes in
physical condition: "The majority has now made the rule the ex-
clusive test and has confined the 'change in conditions' portion of the
rule to a change in physical condition. '2 3 If this is so, though nowhere
does the majority of the court in the MacDonald case so state it, then
factors such as increased population and other socio-economic changes
would not be included. If Judge Barnes is correct, however, then
perhaps this explains the court's decision in the Kroen case.24 Never-
theless, other judges and commentators have interpreted the test much
more broadly. 5 Also, it is difficult to ascertain the maximum distance
that a changed condition can exist from the area desiring amendment
so as to satisfy the test.
But the greatest drawback in using the rule is that it completely
thwarts the efforts of legislative or zoning authorities in the absence of
satisfaction of one of the requirements; there are many circumstances
where change is desirable, but impossible, due to the rule. The facts in
the MacDonald case are illustrative. The property in question was
zoned single family residential but had never been developed. As such,
there could be no showing of a change in condition. The developers
desired to construct high-rise apartments on the land, and though the
zoning board had ultimately determined that this might be a better
use for the land, no one had been able to prove the original zoning was
clearly erroneous when passed. The reason for the change was
evident - ideas had changed. A more modern jurisdiction would
have allowed the change had the proponents shown the amendment to
be reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious; the Maryland court, not
able to satisfy the "mistake or change" test, had no choice but to strike
down the amendment, no matter how reasonable and desirable it
appeared to be.
Other jurisdictions have adopted far more liberal and flexible tests
in efforts to avoid the adverse effects of the "mistake or change" test.2 8
23. MacDonald, 238 Md. 549, at 581, 210 A.2d 325, at 343. The recent case of
Finney v. Halle, 216 A.2d 530 (Md. 1966) held that the construction of the Baltimore
Beltway and the excavation of sewers were sufficient changes in condition to justify a
zoning amendment.
24. 209 Md. 420, 121 A.2d 181 (1956).
25. See, e.g., RATHKOPF, Op. cit. supra note 22, at 27-19, where he states:
The term "changed condition" need not relate to actual physical conditions already
present; it may relate to social or economic conditions reasonably foreseeable and
presently, or potentially operating upon the community. The terms "mistake in
the original ordinance" may refer to a failure to foresee as well as to an actual,
then present error of classification or boundary.
26. The entire area is thoroughly discussed in YOKL4Y, op. cit. supra note 22,§§ 85-87 (Supp. 2d ed. 1964), and RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 22, at 27-16 (1964).
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In Oka v. Cole,2 7 the Florida Supreme Court overruled a lower court
holding which had voided a zoning amendment for failing to satisfy
the "mistake or change" test. The Supreme Court said:
[W]e find no authority in our decisions or elsewhere to the effect
that [the mistake or change test] is indispensable, that vested
rights can accrue to neighboring owners, or that ordinances alter-
ing zoning restrictions are to be tested by any standard other than
that applicable to zoning classifications generally, i.e., that the
restriction imposed shall not be arbitrary but reasonably related to
health, safety, or welfare. 28
The New Jersey courts also reject the rigid "mistake or change"
test. In Gruber v. Mayor and Township Committee of Raritan Town-
ship,29 the action of the township was attacked for changing the area
in question from "four residential" to "eight industrial". In validating
the change the court said, "The comprehensive plan evidenced in the
original zoning ordinance was not immutable and could reasonably be
altered either because of changed circumstances or because of changed
viewpoints as to the needs and interests of the entire community." 30
The court went on to say that an overall test of reasonableness had to
be satisfied.3
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has specifically re-
jected the "mistake or change" test as an exclusive test, instead ruling
that it is but one of many relevant factors to be considered: "The peti-
tioners stress that there have been few changes in the neighborhood
since 1926 when the zoning ordinance was adopted. Such a factor,
while relevant, is not controlling. It was one of several circumstances
for the Council to weigh and evaluate.""2
The Illinois court has also adopted the liberal, flexible view, stating
in its opinion that the same standards used to justify original zoning
should be used in ascertaining the propriety of amendatory ordinances:
The validity of an amendatory zoning ordinance, with respect to
the exercise of police power, must be determined by the same rules
and tests as those applied in ascertaining the validity of original
zoning ordinances; and where the amendment of a zoning ordi-
nance is clearly an arbitrary and unreasonable action on the part
of the city council, ostensibly taken to promote the public health,
27. 145 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1962).
28. Id. at 235. This same rule was again stated by a Florida court in Chadwick
v. Layton, 150 So. 2d 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
29. 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962).
30. Id. at 494.
31. See also Fanale v. Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958);
Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957) ; Tremarco v.
Garzio, 55 N.J. Super. 320, 150 A.2d 799 (1959) ; Hochberg v. Borough of Freehold,
40 N.J. Super. 276, 123 A.2d 46 (App. Dist. 1956).
32. Raymond v. Comm. of Public Works of Lowell, 333 Mass. 410, 131 N.E.2d
189, 191 (1956). The same rule was stated in Shapiro v. City of Cambridge, 340
Mass. 652, 166 N.E.2d 208 (1960) ; Cohen v. City of Lynn, 333 Mass. 694, 132 N.E.2d
664 (1956) ; Lamare v. Commissioner of Public Works of Fall River, 324 Mass. 542,
87 N.E.2d 211 (1949).
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safety, comfort, morals or welfare, but having no substantial rela-
tion to any of these objects, such amendment is of no force and
effect. . . . An amendatory ordinance cannot be sustained if the
evidence fails to show that it was passed for the public good, but
instead tends to show it was passed in deference to the wishes of
certain individuals. 8
This same liberal attitude can be found in Iowa, 4 Missouri, 5
North Carolina, 6 Wisconsin, 37 Texas,"8  New York, 9  and Rhode
Island.4" Kentucky, too, rejects the "mistake or change" test except
in cases of spot zoning,4 ' and in the absence of the spot zoning question,
the Kentucky courts apply the reasonableness standard.
The results under the different tests are apparent. Under the
Maryland rule, it is imperative that the original zoning ordinance be
correct not only for the present but also for the future, for change does
not come easy. As stated by Professor Rathkopf in discussing the
Maryland cases:
The Maryland rule would appear to be a limitation upon the
power of the legislative body to rezone rather than a strict rule
of presumption. It requires the proponent of the change to sup-
port it by evidence of such mistake in the original zoning ordi-
nance or of changed conditions as a condition precedent to the
operation of the presumption of validity; but such evidence having
been given, it would appear that the presumption then attaches
with its customary vigor.
42
33. Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 403 Ill. 91, 96 N.E.2d 499, 504-05
(1951). Also see Kennedy v. City of Evanston, 348 II1. 426, 81 N.E. 312 (1932) and
Kinney v. City of Joliet, 411 Ill. 284, 103 N.E.2d 473 (1952).
34. See Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 66 N.W.2d 113, 116-17,
51 A.L.R.2d 251 (1954):
We are of the opinion the governing body of a municipality may amend its
zoning ordinances any time it deems circumstances and conditions warrant such
action, and such an amendment is valid if the procedural requirements of the
statutes are followed and it is not unreasonable or capricious nor inconsistent with
the spirit and design of the zoning statute. The burden is upon the plaintiffs
attacking the amendment to establish that the acts of the council were arbitrary,
unreasonable, unjust and out of keeping with the spirit of the zoning statutes.
This case was noted in 33 TEXAS L. REv. 763 (1955). The Iowa view is further
elaborated upon in Plaza Recreational Center v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa 246, 111 N.W.2d
758 (1961).
35. See, e.g., Miller v. Kansas City, 358 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1962).
36. See, e.g., Walker v. Town of Elkin, 254 N.C. 85, 118 S.E.2d 1 (1961).
37. See, e.g., Eggebeen v. Sonnenburg, 239 Wisc. 213, 1 N.W.2d 84 (1941).
38. See, e.g., Reichert v. City of Hunter's Creek Village, 345 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.
Ct. Civ. App. 1961) and City of Irving v. Bull, 369 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1963).
39. See, e.g., McCabe v. Town of Oyster Bay, 13 App. Div. 2d 979, 217 N.Y.S.2d
163 (1961) ; Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sands Point, 6 App. Div. 2d 701, 174
N.Y.S.2d 283 (1958), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212, 160 N.E.2d 501 (1959).
40. See, e.g., Hadley v. Harold Realty Co., 198 A.2d 149 (R.I. 1964) and
Cianciarulo v. Tarro, 92 R.I. 352, 168 A.2d 719 (1961).
41. See, e.g., Hodge v. Luckett, 357 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1962) ; Leutenmayer v.
Mathis, 333 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1959) ; Shemwell v. Speck, 265 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1954);
Byrn v. Beechwood Village, 253 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1952).
42. RATHROPF, op. cit. supra note 22, at 27-16 (1964).
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In Maryland, then, it is virtually impossible to zone undeveloped areas,
for it is most difficult for a planner to accurately predict the needs of
certain regions a great many years in advance. When passed, the ordi-
nance might have been correct; years later, it might no longer be con-
sonant with new theories on zoning and planning. As ideas change,
the law must change with it. New theories of planning are useless if
they cannot be carried forth due to outmoded zoning law. The Mary-
land "mistake or change" rule is a definite bar to the application of
modern ideas of zoning and planning, and until it is discarded for a
more modern test, progress in Maryland will be retarded.
Today, planning revolves around a comprehensive plan.4" It in-
volves planning in advance for large areas, and it cannot be effective if
the zoning aspects of the plan are retarded by the Maryland rule. The
New Jersey court has stated: "The comprehensive plan evidenced in
the original zoning ordinance was not immutable and could reasonably
be altered either because of changed circumstances or because of changed
viewpoints as to the needs and interests of the entire community." 44
Note the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's statement concerning flexibility
and the comprehensive plan: "It is a matter of common sense and
reality that a comprehensive plan is not like the law of Medes and the
Persians; it must be subject to reasonable change from time to time as
conditions in an area or a township or a large neighborhood change. ' 45
Judge Barnes, after making an exhaustive survey of all of the
states and writers, felt no recourse but to issue his dissent in the
MacDonald case. Realizing the conflict with effective planning caused
by the court's re-affirmance of the "mistake or change" test, he most
effectively advocated overturning this rule:
As above indicated, ideas change. They particularly change
in considering zoning reclassification in a volatile situation and par-
ticularly in an area of rural virgin territory in the process of
change to urban or suburban development. The syllogisms of the
"mistake-change in condition" rule applied by the majority give
no place to these new ideas. As I see the matter, it is entirely
possible that the original zoning viewed in the light of conditions
existing at the time of the formulation of the original comprehen-
sive plan might have been proper and in accordance with the then
recognized zoning concepts, and, with no change in physical con-
ditions in the meantime, a new subdivision, prepared in accord-
ance with more modern and more enlightened zoning ideas, be
proper a relatively short time later. If we broadened our perspec-
tive and raised our sights in the "change in conditions" portion of
the rule to include changes in zoning concepts and philosophy and
did not limit it to a change in physical conditions merely, the
problem would be largely solved. The people's representatives
43. See Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154(1955).
44. Gruber v. Mayor & Township Committee of Raritan Township, 39 N.J. 1,
186 A.2d 489, 494 (1962) (emphasis added.)
45. Furniss v. Township of Lower Merion, 412 Pa. 404, 194 A.2d 926, 927 (1962).
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would then be free to give effect to the new ideas and concepts;
they would arise from the present Procrustean bed upon which we
have placed them, with renewed vigor, to advance the public in-
terest. The case at bar is an excellent example of the unfortunate
effect of the presently restricted rule." '46
SPOT ZONING
Even if the obstacle of the "mistake or change" test can be over-
come, there is always the possibility that a proposed amendment might
constitute illegal spot zoning, and the proponents of the change must
take steps to guard against this possibility.
Spot zoning was defined in detail by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Cassel v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.4 7 In that
case, application was made to amend existing zoning in the Howard
Park section of Baltimore City so as to allow the establishment of a
funeral home in an otherwise residential area. The court denied the
application as it would constitute an illegal spot zone, stating:
Spot zoning, the arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of a
small area within a zoning district to a use which is inconsistent
with the use to which the rest of the district is restricted, has
appeared in many cities in America as a result of pressure put
upon councilmen to pass amendments to zoning ordinances solely
for the benefit of private interests .... It is, therefore, universally
held that a "spot zoning" ordinance, which singles out a parcel of
land within the limits of a use district and marks it off with a
separate district for the benefit of the owner, thereby permitting a
use of that parcel inconsistent with the use permitted in the rest
of the district, is invalid if not in accordance with the compre-
hensive plan and is merely for private gain.4s
The court went on to add that spot zoning would not be illegal when it
did not conflict with the comprehensive plan and was in harmony with
orderly growth in the locality and the public welfare. It also stated that
the "mistake or change" test still had to be satisfied.
The spot zoning rule has been applied in Maryland as stated in
the Cassel case, but with inconsistent results. In an early case, Ellicott
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,49 the court approved the
creation of a spot zone in a residential area to erect a gasoline station.
It based its decision on the changed condition of increased traffic,
thereby allowing the erection of a gasoline station because it was in
the best interests of the public welfare. On the other hand, a 17%
46. 238 Md. 549, 581-82, 210 A.2d 325, 343-44 (1965).
47. 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950).
48. Id. at 355, 73 A.2d at 488-89. For application of the same rule in other states,
see, e.g., Leahy v. Inspector of Buildings of City of New Bedford, 308 Mass. 128,
31 N.E.2d 436 (1941) ; Jersey Triangle Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 127 N.J.L. 194,
21 A.2d 845 (1941) ; Polk v. Axton, 306 Ky. 498, 208 S.W.2d 497 (1948) ; Page v.
City of Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280 (1946).
49. 180 Md. 176, 23 A.2d 649 (1941).
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increase in traffic was not considered a sufficient reason to enact a spot
zone to erect a gasoline station in an agricultural zone in American
Oil Co. v. Miller.5° Also, in Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v.
Byrd,5 ' the court ruled that increased traffic was not such an over-
riding issue as to allow the enactment of a spot zone for a gasoline
station in a residential neighborhood.
When Baltimore County rezoned to commercial land adjacent to
the newly opened Baltimore-Harrisburg Expressway, while the rest
of the land in the area remained residential, the court found illegal
spot zoning. 2 The court did not feel that the need for tourist facilities
on the expressway was related to the public welfare to such an extent
as to justify spot zoning. Yet, in Offutt v. Board of Zoning Appeals
of Baltimore County,5 the court ruled that the rezoning of land from
residential to industrial was proper and not illegal spot zoning, as
this type of change was consistent with the general welfare.
It is evident from these cases that each case must rest on its own
particular facts. There can be no real predictability except in the most
obvious cases. But the fact remains that spot zoning is an evil to be
protected against, and legislatures and courts should not relax their
stringent standards against spot zoning even if they reject the "mistake-
change" test. The ultimate aim of zoning is to plan for the betterment
and benefit of the public, and it is the antithesis of this aim to allow
zoning amendments for the benefit of private individuals. Illegal spot
zoning and "reasonableness" are mutually exclusive; under the pro-
posed "reasonableness" test, providing for flexibility and change in
zoning, the evil of spot zoning must still be avoided.
NON-EuCLIDEAN ZONING As A VEHICLE
FOR FLEXIBILITY IN ZONING
In recent years, a few courts have made provision for a new
tool to aid in the accomplishment of flexible planning - the "floating
zone". A "floating zone" is one which is not earmarked to a specific
location but will attach to any piece of land in the zone at the applica-
tion of the property owners. As such, it "floats" over an entire area,
attaching on a piecemeal basis to specific properties. It is odd that the
Maryland court is but one of two state courts which have actually
accepted this concept. For a court dedicated to principles of stability,
it has embraced a totally non-Euclidean method of effecting zoning
change. The court had previously validated the use of a "floating
zone" in Baltimore County in Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals of
Baltimore County,"4 and in the 1965 case of Beall v. Montgomery
50. 204 Md. 32, 102 A.2d 747 (1954).
51. 191 Md. 632, 62 A.2d 588 (1948).
52. Hewitt v. County Comm'rs of Baltimore County, 220 Md. 48, 151 A.2d
144 (1959).
53. 204 Md. 551, 105 A.2d 219 (1953).
54. 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1956).
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County Council,55 it: allowed a "floating zone" in Montgomery
County.56  *.. !
The Baltimore County floating zone was an M-R (light indus-
trial) zone, which was to allow certain light industries to be developed
in residential areas. The zone was not delineated as to area, but would
attach to a given piece of land upon application by the landowner and
approval by the Zoning Commission. In allowing the use of such a
zone, the Court of Appeals equated the "floating zone" with a "special
exception,""7 and said:
If the regulations be read as we read them, it is clear that the
Manufacturing, Restricted classification is analogous to a special
exception, and the rules which are applicable to special exceptions
would apply, not the general rules of original error or change in
conditions of the character of the neighborhood, that control the
propriety of rezoning. This is because, as in the case of a special
exception, there.:has been a prior legislative determination, as
part of a comprehensive plan, that the use which the administra-
tive body permits, upon application to the particular case of the
specified standards, is prima facie proper in the environment in
which it is permitted.58
Thus, once the "floating use" is determined to be compatible with the
existing use in the area (the Maryland court felt that light industry was
compatible with residential use), then the zone could attach upon acti-
vation of the required, procedures.59 In 1960, a floating zone was
upheld in Howard County in Costello v. Sieling.6" The court referred
to the Huff case in upholding a floating trailer-park zone as com-
patible with the existing, agricultural zone.
The Beall case, involved a floating R-H (high-rise residential)
zone in Montgomery County. In upholding the use of such a zone
there, Judge Barnes cited the preceding Maryland cases and held that
these cases and the legislature's determination that this use was com-
patible with the classification of neighboring property were controlling.
55. 240 Md. 77, 212 A.2d 751 (1965).
56. The use of the "floating zone" in Maryland is discussed in an excellent article
by Professor Russell Reno, Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of the Floating Zone,
23 MD. L. Rev. 105 (1963).
57. The use of "special exceptions" in Maryland is discussed in Carson, Reclassi-
fication, Variances, and Special Exceptions in Maryland, 21 MD. L. Rev. 306 (1961).
58, 214 Md. at 62, 13 'A.2d at 91.
59. There was a dissenting opinion in the case in which the "floating zone" was
attacked as invalid spot-zoning. As such, it could be changed only on meeting. the
"mistake-change" test:
The scheme of the ordinance is the negation of zoning. It overrides the basic
concept of use zoning by districts, that is to say, territorial division according to
the character of the lands and structures and their peculiar use suitability and a
comprehensive regulatory plan to advance the general good within the prescribed
range of the police power.
214 Md. at 68, 133 A.2d at 95, quoting Rockhill v. Chesterfield Township, 23 N.J. 117,
128 A.2d 473 (1957).
60. 223 Md. 24, 161 A.2d 824 (1960).
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A unanimous Court of Appeals followed Judge Barnes' lead and altered
the existing zoning without the use of the "mistake-change" test.6
New York is the only other state to approve the use of the
"floating zone." In Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown,62 the Court of
Appeals of New York approved the creation of a new B-B zone (allow-
ing single or multi-family dwellings) in any residential district upon
application by the landowner. The court reasoned that the zone was
created in the interests of public welfare and was neither arbitrary nor
capricious. It did not constitute spot zoning, for it was enacted for the
benefit of the entire community. The court viewed this as just another
means of amending existing zoning laws; the amendment took place
at the time the legislature passed the floating zone scheme; and only
the affixation of its actual boundaries was delayed until a later period.
It may be noted that the floating zone in Rodgers was much broader
than that used in Huff, for in Rodgers a multiplicity of uses were
permitted by the new zone (single or multi-family dwelling), while
in Huff only one specified use was allowed. Still, both were approved.63
The only other court to rule on the use of the "floating zone" is
Pennsylvania, and that court struck down the use of such a zone in
Eves v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Lower Gwynedd Township.64
The court ruled that it was not in conjunction with an existing com-
prehensive plan as provided for in Pennsylvania enabling legislation,
and the fact that it might be in conjunction with comprehensive plan-
ning for the future would not suffice to uphold it. The court was a
proponent of strict judicial review in the zoning area and felt that this
aim would be defeated by the case-by-case rezoning concomitant with
floating zones.
Yet in Donahue v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Whitema-sh
Township,65 the Pennsylvania court upheld a scheme whereby a
property owner could apply for an amendment to a floating apartment
house zone. The court differentiated this from the Eves case because
in Donahue, within six weeks of approval of the change, the zoning
map was amended to reflect the reclassification. The court thereby
viewed the entire procedure as one amendatory transaction and differ-
entiated this from a "floating zone". It felt that this was still in
accordance with the existing comprehensive plan for the area. Though
61. In his dissenting opinion in the MacDonald case, Judge Barnes very con-
vincingly argues that the R-H zone in Prince George's County should have qualified
as a floating zone. In referring to it in Beall, he differentiates this case due to the
fact that in MacDonald, the Technical Staff and Planning Commission initially dis-
approved the application, though the County Council and lower court subsequently
approved it. At no time was it argued that the Prince George's R-H zone was a
floating zone, so the majority would not consider it. In Beall, all legislative and
administrative bodies approved the application, and the floating zone was approved.
62. 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
63. The dissenting opinion in Rodgers was similar to the one in Huff, attacking
this as illegal spot zoning, etc., 96 N.E.2d at 738:
On the contrary, a person purchasing property in Tarrytown in a Residence A
or B district to bring up his children now has no way of knowing whether the
property next to his may or may not become the site of a multiple family dwelling
with the attendant increases in population, traffic dangers, commerce and congestion.
64. 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
65. 412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963).
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the court made this distinction, it is possible that the Pennsylvania
court may use the case as a basis to reconsider the Eves case, as the
distinction appears to be a rather tenuous one.
The "floating zone" concept has caused a great deal of contro-
versy. Strong arguments, pro and con, have been raised. One argu-
ment against the use of the "floating zone" has been that it is unfair
to neighboring property owners, because the protection afforded them
under Euclidean zoning is no longer present. As put by one writer
defending the Eves case:
[I]t would be unfair and superficial to view the Gwynedd
Township decision as the product of blind adherence to zoning
concepts of the twenties. The court was obviously and rightly
concerned with other traditional concepts which are perhaps more
important than zoning principles, old or new. Notice, equality
under the law, and all that makes up our notions of fairness may
be wrongly sacrificed in the name of progress. Thus, even if the
advocates of flexible zoning are correct in claiming that it repre-
sents progress in land-use control, it is better to advance slowly,
than to sacrifice due process rights. 6
It is also argued that all "floating zones" constitute spot zoning merely
because they are not in accordance with a then existing comprehen-
sive plan, the existence of the plan being vital to any successful
zoning scheme.' 7
These arguments, though valid, can be refuted. First of all, it must
be kept in mind that there are very stringent standards that must be
met before one will be granted the right to a "floating zone".6" And
presuming a high degree of integrity on the part of the member of the
reviewing body, it can be said that the public welfare will at all times
be fostered. Therefore, fears of spot zoning should be no greater than
they were before the advent of "floating zones".
The argument of lack of notice to the property owners is also
refutable. Everyone has notice that the zone exists. If the zone is of
the Maryland type, where the compatibility test is rigidly adhered to,
then its application theoretically will not be detrimental to nearby prop-
erty owners. The same risk is run where special exceptions, variances
or amendments are possible. Of course, property values may fall, but
66. Harr and Hering, The Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning
or an Inflexible Judiciary, 74 HARV. L. RiV. 1552, 1573 (1961).
67. For further criticisms, see Mosher, The Floating Zone: Legal Status and
Application to Gasoline Stations, 1 TULSA L. Rev. 149 (1964).
68. For example, before one can obtain an M-R floating zone in Baltimore County,
he must file a petition with the Zoning Commissioner showing complete building and
topographical development plans. The Zoning Commissioner must then get a favorable
recommendation from the Planning Commission. Subsequently, a public hearing is
held by the Zoning Commission, from which an appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals
may be taken.
All approved plans must meet stringent maintenance requirements for the buildings
and grounds. Height and area regulations must be complied with. Off-street parking
requirements must be met, and parking areas must be paved and lighted. Reclassifica-
tion will result if these rules are not complied with.
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this is not usually a legitimate zoning concern. Inevitably, in certain
instances, individual property owners must suffer for the public good.
The proponents of "floating zones" cite flexibility and planning
advantages. Though applicable primarily to new areas, they also have
applicability to developed areas. Due to the impossibility of applying
strict zoning standards at an early developmental stage, the use of the
"floating zone" allows for unrestricted development in new areas; at the
same time, though, the strict standards that must be met before grant-
ing a change to a "floating zone" provide protection to already exist-
ing uses. Its main virtue is that it unshackles undeveloped lands from
the retardation of pre-ordained zoning, particularly in areas such as
Maryland where amendment is so hard to obtain. 69
This is not to advocate wholesale creation of "floating zones";
this, admittedly, would lead to chaos, and all attempts to do this thus
far have been blocked by the courts.7' But used prudently, in areas not
conducive to definitive restrictions and in jurisdictions adverse to
change, the concept of the "floating zone" is certainly advisable. It
allows for freedom to change when ideas change, and when the plan-
ners deem it necessary. It protects against the chance of less prudent
zoning at first and the inability to effect change when later desired.
Used carefully, then, the "floating zone" serves to rectify some of the
defects of the Maryland "mistake or change" test.
CONCLUSION
The "mistake or change" test places Maryland with the least
progressive states regarding amendment of existing zoning ordinances.
Its defects and adverse effects are serious enough to merit departure
from this rule in favor of a test of "reasonableness"; and although stare
decisis may be argued as a bar to change, the Maryland court has
stated on several occasions that when the reason behind a rule ceases
to exist, the rule itself will no longer apply. 71 This is not, of course,
to in any way advocate departure from strict rules to prevent spot
zoning. Still, the Maryland court has prudently allowed the use of the
"floating zone," which is most desirable in an effort to overcome the
inherent difficulties of effecting changes in Maryland. Even though
the court appears to be inconsistent, further development in the "float-
ing zone" area is warranted until such time, and even after, that the
court rejects the "mistake or change" test.
69. For favorable comments concerning the use of "floating zones", see Note, Spot-
Zoning and the Comprehensive Plan, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 303 (1959); and Note,
Non-Euclidean Zoning - Its Theoretical Validity and Practical Desirability in Under-
developed Areas, 30 U. CINc. L. Rev. 297 (1961).
70. In Rockhill v. Chesterfield Township, 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957), the
court struck down a zoning scheme whereby the entire township was zoned residential
and agricultural, and provision was made for a multitude of special exceptions. It
termed such a scheme the antithesis of zoning and an invitation to spot zoning. See
also Town of Hobart v. Collier, 3 Wis. 2d 182, 87 N.W.2d 868 (1958); and State
v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
71. See, e.g., State v. Cohen, 166 Md. 682, 687-88, 172 Atl. 274, 277 (1934);
Barker v. Ayers, 5 Md. 202, 209 (1853).
